Payments System Risk: What Is It and What Will Happen If We Try To Reduce It?
0TH commercial banks and the Federal Reserve assume a certain amount of risk in particirating in the payments system. This paper provides an introduction to payments system risk and the public policy issues involved in limiting the risk. Using simple balance sheet entries to illustrate, the paper will examine how policies intended to reduce payments system risk would affect banks and bank customers.
PAYMENTS SYSTEM RISK: WHAT IS IT?
Many banks overdraw their reserve accounts at the Federal Reserve during part of each business day as they process payments within the payments system. The Federal Reserve is concerned about the extent of this intraday credit for several reasons. First of all, since it does not charge interest on the inti-aday credit it extends, it is providing this overdraft facility at no cost to banks and, thus, may he overused by banks. Second, and more important, it is possible, though unlikely, that a bank could fail while its reserve account is overdr-awn. In this event, the Federal Reserve would become a general creditor of the failed bank. Finally, the Fed is concerned with the risk that banks assume through their participation in private wire transfer systems. Current Federal Reserve policy is designed to limit the risk assumed by Reserve Banks as well as commercial banks who participate in private systems for their electronic payments. See appendix 1 for a description of that policy.)
Federal Reserve Iiavlight Overdrn/i Risk anti the Operation of Fedwire
While various types of transactions affect the reserve balances of banks, daylight overdt-afts generally reflect large transactions through Fedwire, the wire transfer system operated by the Federal Reserve System. Institutions with reserve or clearing accounts at a Reserve Bank may transfer their reserve balances to other institutions that have similar accounts. These transfer-s, which averaged $605 billion per business day in 1987, are processed electronically thi-ough Fedwire.
Federal Reserve Banks transfer reserves to receiving banks even if the reserve balance of the sending bank is insufficient to cover the transfers. Transfers over Fedwire are "final" when the receiving banks are notified of the transfers. Thus, if a sending bank should fail while its reserve account was over-drawn, the Federal Reserve would have no claim on banks that received reserves fi-omn the failed bank over Fedwire. U.S. Treasury and agency securities also are transferred among banks over Fedwire. Ownership JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1989 records of these securities are maintained in each Federal Reserve Bank's computer system. Banks can transfer securities held in their names to other institutions through these computers, a system called "book-entry." A transfer of securities in book-envy form can be arranged either in conjunction with a transfer of reserves of equal value or as a separate transaction. Such securities transactions contribute to daylight overdrafts, since typically the reserve accounts of banks are debited when their book-entry securities accounts are credited. Transfers of book-entry securities over Fedwire averaged $312 billion per day in 1987.
The Federal Reserve measures its exposure to payments system risk by simply summing the maximum daylight overdraft each day across all banks. In 1987, the Fed's exposure to daylight overdrafts averaged $112 billion, approximately 53 percent of which can be attributed to transactions involving book-entry government securities.' Some specific features of this risk measure should be noted. First, unlike conventional risk measures, the Federal Reserve's measure does not incorporate the probability that a bank will fail while in an overdraft position or the probability of Fed losses in such situations Since the Federal Reserve has never incurred a loss on daylight overdrafts, the probability of losses in the future are quite low.
Second, it exceeds the actual sum of reserve account overdrafts at any point during the day; the maximum overdrafts of individual banks typically occur at different times during the day. Third, it represents the loss that the Federal Reserve would incur on a given day if all banks with overdrawn reserve accounts failed when their overdrafts were at maximum levels and the Federal Reserve recovered nothing.
Systemic Risk and the Operation of CHIPS
The Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) is an electronic payment system operated by the New York Clearing House. It currently is the only private electronic payment system in operation in the United States. CHIPS has about 140 members, which include U.S-chartered banks and foreign banks. Members of CHIPS send and receive payment messages during the day; no funds are actually transferred to cover these payment messages, however, until the end of the day. Net obligations are settled at day's end through Fedwire transfers in the reserve accounts of CHIPS participants. Banks in net debit positions on CHIPS at the end of the day (value of payment messages sent exceeds the value of payment messages received) transfer funds from their accounts at Reserve Banks to a reserve account maintained by the clearing house at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, while banks in net credit positions receive reserve transfers from that account. The value of payment messages processed by CHIPS averaged $555 billion per day in 1987.
Systemic risk refers to the risk that the failure of one bank will cause one or more other banks to fail. One way that this could happen is through participation in CHIPS. If a bank fails while in a net debit position on CHIPS, other-CHIPS participants could suffer losses as well, depending on the procedures in force for dealing with such a default. Payments over Fedwire, in contrast, involve no To relate this measure to systemic risk is difficult, however; under current CHIPS rules, payment messages do not reflect intraday extensions of credit among banks but provisional payments which may be unwound at the end of the day. If a bank could not cover its net debit position on CHIPS at the end of the day, all payment messages to and from that bank would be canceled; new net debit and credit positions would then be calculated for the remaining CHIPS participants, and payments would be made to cover these revised positions. Unwinding CHIPS payments because of a defaulting bank, however, could expose the remaining CHIPS participants to losses if their de-'Daylight overdrafts attributed to transactions in book-entry securities are calculated as follows. A bank is in a net credit position on book-entry securities transfers if the value of securities transferred to the bank's book-entry securities account exceeds the value of securities transferred out of that account to other banks. The book-entry overdraft of a bank for each day equals its largest net credit position on securities transfers that occurs while the reserve account of the bank is overdrawn.
'In conventional definitions, risk is specified in terms of the probability distribution of returns on an investment. Under one definition, risk may be measured as the variance of the distribution of returns. See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) .
positors had withdrawn balances credited to their accounts during the day based on payment messages from the defaulting bank. These banks in turn may be unable to recover the funds withdrawn by their depositors during the day.'
Federal Reserve Policy on Payments System Risk
In recent years, the Federal Reserve Board has taken actions to limit its own risk and the systemic risk involved in CHIPS. The Federal Reserve induced CHIPS to require each bank in its system to establish bilateral net debit limits with each other CHIPS participant, beginning in 1984. Under another program that went into effect in March 1986, the Federal Reserve requires banks to set limits on their daylight overdrafts across Fedwire and CHIPS. (See appendix 1 for details of these policies .1 The Fed is currently studying proposals to establish an explicit or implicit price for daylight overdrafts of reserve accounts.
HOW PAYMENTS AFFECT RISK
This section uses simple balance sheets of hypothetical banks to illustrate how transactions through the payments system affect the exposure of the Federal Reserve and commercial banks to potential losses. The illustrations involve federal funds transactions and transactions among CHIPS participants. Appendix 2 illustrates how the payment practices of banks that serve government securities dealers and those that issue and redeem commercial paper affect their reserve overdrafts.
Federal Funds Transactions
Banks that borrow federal funds overnight are concerned primarily about their reserve balances as of the end of the day, rather than during the day, for two reasons. First, the Federal Reserve is more tolerant of daylight overdrafts of reserve accounts than of negative reserve balances at the close of business. Second, the intraday reserve balances do not count toward meeting reserve requirements; only those balances held at the end of the business day do.
Banks that borrow overnight federal funds typically receive reserves from the lending banks over Fedwire late in the day; they return the requisite reserve balances the following morning. Such 5 transfers can cause the borrowing banks to overdraw their reserve balances during the day.
The balance sheet entries in This transaction created a liability for Bank A (federal funds purchased) and shifted $25 of the assets of Bank B from reserve balances to federal funds sold.
The first transaction by Bank A in the current day is a transfer of $25 from its reserve account to the reserve account of Bank B, returning the funds it had borrowed overnight; this eliminates the liability of federal funds purchased by Bank A. Since the balance in the reserve account of Bank A was only $10 at the start of the day, the transfer of $25 makes its reserve account overdrawn by $15. This presents no problem for Bank A, howet?er, since it plans to borrow $25 through the federal funds market later in the day to eliminate its reserve overdraft and meet its reserve requirement of $10.
If Rank A borrows the $25 in the federal funds market, the lending bank(s) will transfer the reserves to the account of Bank A in the afternoon. Given the time gap between the transfer of funds to lending banks in the morning and the transfer of reserves to Bank A in the afternoon, the Federal Reserve effectively lends $15 to Bank A during part of the business day by permitting the reserve overdraft.
The Fed is a general creditor of Bank A while its reserve account is overdrawn. To illustrate the risk it assumes in permitting daylight overdrafts, suppose that participants in the federal funds market find out that the value of Bank A's assets have declined by $15 just after Bank A transfers $25 to Bank B. After this information becomes known, Bank A will be unable to borrow reserves in the federal funds market at prevailing market rates. The agency that chartered Bank A must decide whether it is solvent -If Bank A is declared solvent and has assets to pledge as collateral, it could 'The legal status of claims by the banks against their depositors in such situations is currently unclear. See Mengle (1989 Insurance Corporation FOIC). Thus, requiring collateral against reserve over-drafts does not necessarily protect the public sector; it may simply shift the loss from the Federal Reserve to the FDIC.
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form of a wire tr'ansfer over CHIPS. Bank A debits the deposit account of that customer for $25. Because banks do not report their balance sheets on an intraday basis, there is no official term for the offsetting liability entry in this transaction. In this case, we will call it "reserves payable." For Bank B, deposit liabilities and an asset item called 'reserves receivable" each increase by $25.
In the next transaction, a depositor of Bank B directs it to send $25 to a customer of Bank C. After the second transaction, Bank B is even with CHIPS. If there were no more transactions over CHIPS that day involving Bank B, the settlement for CHIPS transactions would have a zero impact on the reserve account of Bank B. Bank A, in contrast, would have its reserve account debited for $25, while Bank C would have its account credited by $25. Bank A would have to increase its reserve balance before the time for settlement of CHIPS payments to facilitate settlement.
Suppose that, before the end of the day, adverse publicity prevents Bank A from borrowing $25 in the federal funds market. This situation could create a liquidity problem for Bank B -If Bank A cannot obtain sufficient reserves to cover its net debit position on CHIPS, current rnles call for unwinding all transactions involving Bank A and settling the transactions among the remaining CHIPS participants. This settlement would involve a transfer of $25 in reserves from Bank B to Bank C.
Such a net settlement cannot take place, however, because Bank B has only $10 in its reserve account. Thus, unless the Federal Reserve lends $25 to Bank A or Bank B, all CHIPS transactions for the day would be canceled.
Simulation exercises indicate that the unwinding of transactions with one large CHIPS participant that cannot meet its payment obligations would make a high percentage of other participants unable to meet their commitments on Federal Reserve policymakers have indicated that such changes would be adopted only after CHIPS has developed arrangements for ensuring the execution of payments on that system that they consider acceptable.s This section also illustrates the implications of such an arrangement for banks.
Explicit Pricing of Daylight Overdrafts of Reserve Accounts
One way to reduce Federal Reserve risk would be to charge a fee on daylight overdrafts. If the fee were high enough, banks would reduce the size of their overdrafts by changing their practices for' making payments.
Responses ofBanks to Pricing Daylight Overdrafts -Perhaps the easiest and least expensive change for most of the relatively large banks would involve routing more of their wire transfers of funds through CHIPS rather than Fedwire. There are other ways for banks to reduce their reserve account overdrafts. They could purchase more of their federal funds as term federal funds or under rollover arrangements that involve paying a daily rate but eliminating the daily transfer of ieserve balances. Pricing total daylight overdrafts of reserve balances (including book-entry overdrafts) would impose costs on the clearing banks, which they would pass on to the government securities dealers they serve. The dealer-s could reduce bookentry daylight overdrafts by building smaller-inventories of securities dur-ing the day or' holding larger inventor-ies overnight. Banks that act as agents in issuing commer-cial paper could charge 'Humphrey (1986) . 'Mengle (1989) . 'For discussions of these possible changes from Federal Reserve sources, see Belton, et al. (1987) , Corrigan (1987) , Johnson (1988 ), Task Force (1988 ) and Mengle, et at. (1987 . For discussions of these issues by those in the private sector, see Flannery (1987 ), Faulhaber, et at. (1989 and Large Dollar Payments System Advisory Group (1988) . Governor Wayne D. Angell of the Federal Reserve Board has proposed another approach to revising policy on payments system risk. Under the Angell proposal, the Federal Reserve would prohibit daylight overdrafts. Transfers of reserves that would make the reserve balance of a bank negative would be funded as discount window loans. To provide banks incentives to hold enough reserves to prevent overdrafts, the Federal Reserve would pay interest on excess reserves, but at a rate below the discount rate. See VanHoose (1988) . 'Johnson (1988) , p. 15.
issuers for the fees on overdrafts or delay payments to issuers until they receive payments from purchasers.
Effects in Financial Markets -Pricing daylight overdrafts could have a variety of indirect effects in the financial markets. Banks that lend in the over'-night federal funds market could find that their reserves are being returned later the following day. The time value of intraday reserves might lead to the development of an intraday federal funds market, with lenders making reserve balances available to borrowers for only part of the business day. Some analysts think this could lead to greater variability in an overnight federal funds rate and other interest i-ates.°B anks could limit the size of their-daylight overdrafts by delaying wire transfers of funds for-depositors that do not demand immediate delivery of funds; or, the might charge an extra fee to depositors that demand immediate delivery.
Clearing banks would charge government securities dealers for the cost of the fee on daylight overdr-afts. Government securities dealers, in turn, would increase the transaction costs of buying and selling gover-nment securities. Interest rates on government securities would rise somewhat relative to yields on alternative investments, increasing the Treasury's cost of servicing the national debt.
How banks react to daylight overdraft fees could affect market yields on other financial instruments. For instance, the fee on overdrafts would increase the costs to banks acting as agents for fir-ms that issue cornmner-cial paper. The r-esponses by the agent banks could increase the costs to fir'ms of raising funds by issuing commercial paper."
Supplemental Balance Requirement
The Federal Reserve could impose an implicit price on daylight overdrafts by requiring the banks that overdraw their reserve accounts to hold supplemental reserve balances. These requirements would be set to cover part or all of their daylight overdrafts. The suggested interest rate to be paid on the supplemental balances would be slightly below the federal funds rate, thus creating an opportunity cost of holding supplemental reserves. This cost would have the same implications for bank behavior and financial markets as an equal explicit fee on daylight overdrafts.
The implications of a supplemental reserve requir-ement can be examined by adjusting the balance sheet entries in , et al. (1987) for the basis for such a rate. If an agent bank continues the timing of payments described in appendix 2 in issuing and redeeming commercial paper, the overdrafts fee would cost $54.79 per $1 million of commercial paper issued and redeemed. If the banks pass this cost on to the issuers, the annual cost of raising funds by issuing commercial paper every 30 days would rise by 7 basis points. "A risk-based capital ratio is calculated as a measure of capital divided by weighted assets, with weights assigned as approxi~m ations to relative risk. Reserves have a weight of zero. See "Proposals for International Convergence" (1988) . "Assume that these additional federally insured deposits have a zero reserve requirement. To illustrate the implications for FDIC risk, suppose that after Bank A transfers $25 to Bank B, there is a public announcement of events that reduce the value of the assets of Bank A by $15. Bank A fails and the FDIC becomes the receiver. As receiver, the FDIC obtains assets worth $110 and assumes liabilities of $115, for a net loss of $5. In this case, therefore, the supplemental balance requirement shifts risk from the Federal Reserve to the FDIC.
federal funds, increasing the systemic risk in the banking system.
Of course, supplemental balance requirements also would give banks an incentive to reduce the size of the intraday movements in their reserve balances, since the interest rate paid on the balances would be below the marginal return on other assets and below the interest rate on federal funds. The supplemental balance requirement would be i-educed to the extent that a bank kept its reserve balance positive throughout the business day. Suppose, for instance, that Bank A changes its intraday pattern of payments so that, with the supplemental requirement of $15, its reserve balance never falls below $5. The Federal Reserve might reduce its supplemental balance requirement to $10, thus reducing the opportunity cost of Bank A.
Provisions for Settlement flnalitr of Payments over CHIPS
Settlement finality would involve procedures for ensuring the execution of payments (avoid unwinding payments involving a defaulting bank) and the allocation of losses in the event of a default by a CHIPS participant." If losses are spr-ead widely among CHIPS participants, the failurvt of a CHIPS participant to meet its payment obligation would probably not cause other banks to fail.
The implications of settlement finality arrangements for payments system risk are illustrated using the balance sheet entries in table 2. In this illustration, CHIPS is presumed to have formed a bankers' bank, which is a cooperative venture that performs banking services for CHIPS members. This institution processes payment messages for its members as debit and credit entries to their demand deposit accounts at the bankers' bank.' 1
The illustration is based on some general principles of settlement finality arrangements that have been consider-ed for several years."
The hypothetical ar-r'angement requires members of CHIPS as a group to pledge enough collateral with their bankers' bank to cover the largest net debit position of any one participant. This is based on the idea that a default by one large participant would disrupt the oper-ation of CHIPS. Since there has never been a default by a CHIPS participant, however, a default by one large participant is an unlikely event. Collateral requirements for CHIPS participants in excess of the largest net debit of an individual CHIPS participant could he interpreted as an excessive degree of precaution.
In table 2, the largest net debit position is $25.
To cover this position (and to allow some margin for-error), CHIPS requires each of the three banks to pledge $10 of their interest-earning assets with CHIPS in the form of Treasury securities.
Suppose that after CHIPS processes the transactions described in table 2, an announcement indicates a $15 loss in the value of Bank A's assets. tinder the settlement finality arrangement, CHIPS would use the collateral posted by its participants to raise $25, either by selling part of the collateral "Discussions of the finality of payments on private wire transfer systems mention three aspects of finality. Sender finality makes each message over the payments system final when sent. Payment messages cannot be canceled later in the day. The rules for payment messages on CHIPS include sender finality. Settlement finality refers to procedures that would ensure the settlement of payments if a participant defaults on its net debit at the end of the day. CHIPS does not have settlement finality procedures in place at this time. Under current procedures, CHIPS would cancel all payments by the bank that defaults, as well as all payments to that bank, and calculate new net debit or credit positions for the remaining participants. This section illustrates the implications of adopting a form of settlement finality.
Under receiver finality, credits to the deposit accounts of the customers of CHIPS participants would be final when the receiving banks receive payments messages over CHIPS. If a sending bank defaults, the receiving bank would have no recourse to its depositors. CHIPS rules do not include receiver finality. For additional discussion of these aspects of the finality of payments, see Humphrey (1986) and Belton, et al. (1987) .
"CHIPS has considered developing a bankers' bank to ensure that payment obligations over CHIPS would be treated as net rather than gross obligations in the case of a default by a CHIPS participant. See Kantrow (1988)-To illustrate the significance of the distinction between gross and net obligations, suppose a bank fails while it is in a net credit position on CHIPS payments. If CHIPS obligations are treated legally as net obligations, CHIPS participants would make a payment to the receiver of the failed bank for the amount of the net debit position. The receiver of the failed bank might sue CHIPS participants based on gross obligations. Under a successful suit by the receiver, those that had sent payment messages to the failed bank would have to pay the gross amount of those payments, and those who received payment messages from the failed bank would become its general creditors for the amount of the gross transfers from the failed bank. This treatment of CHIPS participants would increase the recovery rate of the failed bank's other general creditors. There have been no such cases to indicate whether the courts would uphold payments to the receiver based on gross payments. Suppose, in contrast, that CHIPS payments are processed through demand deposit accounts at the bankers' bank for CHIPS. Under that arrangement, the only claim of the receiver of the failed bank would be for the positive balance of the failed bank in its demand deposit account at the bankers' bank. " Mengle (1989) .
Call,, nrc-,-, n,uC or using the securities as collateral for a loan at the Federal Reserve discount window. CHIPS would then transfer the $25 to the reserve account of Bank B, facilitating the payment from Bank B to Bank C. In turn, the bankers' bank of CHIPS would hold the $10 in collateral posted by Bank A and have a $15 claim against Bank A as a general creditor-. Losses on the $15 claim against Bank A would thus he spread between Bank B and Bank C. Neither bank would be forced into bankruptcy by a complete loss on the $15 claim.
From the Federal Reserve's perspective, this settlement finality arrangement is better than the procedure that currently would be used to deal with a default by a CHIPS participant -unwinding payments involving the bank. If this settlement finality arrangement were in place, the unwinding of payments, which would disrupt the flow of payments in the economy, could be avoided. If a discount window loan was necessary to avoid a liquidity crisis in the banking system, the collateral would be available through the CHIPS organization. The Federal Reserve would not have to decide which banks should receive discount window loans.
By making the risk to CHIPS participants more explicit, the arrangement would give CHIPS participants stronger incentives to exclude banks in relatively poor-financial condition fiom their system. Banks that are excluded would route their wrre transfers through Fedwire, thus reducing systemic risk. Finally, the spreading of potential losses would limit the chances of the failure of one bank causing others to fail. It is not possible to determine whether the risk of bank failure is lower under current CHIPS pr-ocedures or under this proposed procedure for settlement finality. Such a comparison depends on the extent to which depositors of CHIPS participants draw down the intraday credits to their demand deposit accounts and the success that banks would have in collecting from those depositors in case of a default by a CHIPS participant.
CONCLUSIONS
All banks assume some risk by participating in the payments system. The payment pr-actices that generate this risk were developed in an environment in which ther-e was no interest charge on intraday credit amid, until recently, no constraints on the magnitude of intraday credit. There have been no losses to the Federal Reserve or' to mcmhers of private wire transfer systems resulting from the daylight credit exposures. The Federal Reserve, however', has adopted a policy on payments system risk which includes limits on the daylight over-drafts of individual banks. The Fed has been considering possible changes in its policy to reduce its own risk and provide incentives for banks to change the payment practices that tend to create the intraday risk exposures. One proposed approach involves a fee on daylight overdrafts of reserve accounts. A second appr-oach, which involves an implicit price on daylight overdrafts, requir-es additional reserve balances at the banks which regularly overdr'aw their-reserve accounts during the day. The Federal Reserve would pay interest on these supplemental reserve balances at a rate just below the federal funds rate, tinder either-approach, CHIPS would be required to work out an arrangement that is satisfactory to the Federal Reserve to ensur-e the finality of its payments.
The objective of changing the policy on payments system risk is to reduce the risk of the Federal Reserve without creating a large increase in systemic risk -the risk that the failure of one bank will cause the failtrr-e of other banks, thus disr-upting the operation of the payments system. The type of settlement finality ar-rangement desired by the Federal Reserve would ensure the execution of payments over CHIPS in the event of a default by a CHIPS participant and spread any losses so widely among other CHIPS par-ticipants that one bank failure is unlikely to lead to the failure of other CFIIPS participants. 
Current Federal Reserve Policy on Payments System Risk
Currently, the Federal Reserve uses specific limits on daylight overdrafts of reserve accounts and net debit positions on private wire transfer systems to reduce payments system risk. The limits on net debit positions apply to any private wire transfer system that settles the net positions of its participants through transfers of balances in reserve or clearing accounts at Reserve Banks. Since CHIPS is the only such system in operation, the following description refers only to it, but would apply to any such systemn developed in the future.1
Bilateral Net Credit Limits on CHIPS
The Federal Reserve requires each participant on CHIPS to set a limit on its net credit position on message transfers with each of the other' participants in the system. Funds transfer-messages that violate these bilateral net credit limits are rejected by the computer-system that processes payment messages. CHIPS participants have had bilateral credit limits since October 1984.
Sender Net Debit Caps on CHIPS
The Federal Reserve requires CHIPS to establish limits on the net debit positions of each participant with all other participants on the system CHIPS sets this liniit for each participant at 5 percent of the sum of all bilateral credit limits for that participant extended by all other CHIPS participants.
2 CHIPS established these sender net debit caps in October 1985.
Cross-System Caps
Each bank that occasionally has daylight reserve overdrafts is required to adopt a cap on its crosssystem daylight overdraft. Cross-system refers to the daylight overdraft position on Fedwir-e and CHIPS. The relevant over-draft position for this cap is the sum of a bank's funds-related overdraft of its reserve account and its net debit position on CHIPS at each moment during the day. Each bank sets its cap by placing itself in one of the possible categories indicated in table Al; banks are directed to consider their-creditworthiness, credit policies and operational control and procedures. Each possible rating has corresponding caps for' both the one day and two-week average maximum daylight overdraft, each as a percentage of primary adjusted capital. These percentages have been 'For an analysis of the effects of these credit limits on daylight overdrafts and the operation of the payments system, see Belton, et al. (1987) .
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These tr'ansactions warrant special examination. A few large banks (called clearing banks) specialize in serving government securities dealers; these banks generate a large share of the total daylight overdr-afts of bank reserve accounts. in the second quarter of 1988 for example, four clearing banks accounted for about 70 percent of the daylight overdrafts attributable to transactions in bookentry securities.
Business Practices of Dealers and Clearing Banks -Government securities dealers who buy and sell securities for their customers have no direct access to the book-entry system for' transferring ownership of government securities. Instead, they maintain book-entry securities accounts and demand deposit accounts with commercial banks Daylight overdrafts of the clearing banks' reserve accounts reflect the practices of the government securities dealers in managing their inventories of governments securities. Dealen's hold large inventories of securities during the day to meet the anticipated demands of their customers. To minimize the cost of holding the inventories, the dealers sell most of their secum-ities by the end of the day through repurchase agreements. The investors who enter into these agreements "own" the secur'ities overnight and "resell" them to dealers early the next day. Thus, the dealers build their' inventories of government securities in the mon-ning of each business day by receiving securities returned by the overnight repo investors and buying additional securities offered for sale.'
The following featur-es of the business practices of government securities dealers explain why they genen-ally wait until early afternoon to begin runFor a more complete discussion of the practices of clearing banks and dealers, see Association of Reserve City Bankers (1986).
Securities Transfers
that serve as their clearing banks for securities transfers.
ning down their inventory of securities. Salesmen for a dealer make commitments to deliver specific securities to its customers by the end of the day.
The dealer is then vulnerable to losses if it cannot fulfillthese commitments. The customer-s receive inter-est on the pr'ornised securities for that day, even if the dealer does not make delivery. The customer's, however, make payments to the dealers only when the securities are delivered. The dealer would fail to make delivery if it could not locate the desired secun'ities in its inventory or in the market, or if it sent the wrong securities to a customer' and had them returned. Each dealer attempts to minimize the probability of such 'fails" by waiting until earls' after-noon to dim-ect its clearing bank to send its securities to the bookentry accounts of the banks that serve the customers that have bought them.
Another reason the dealers hold their securities until early afternoon involves potential profits from special orders. On some days, certain issues of government securities ar'e in relatively high demand. The dealers can make larger profits if they have securities available to meet these special orders. In contrast to the specific requirements for special orders, dealers may substitute a wide variety of securities as acceptable collateral for repos.
Effects on lntraday Reserve BalancesThese dealer practices affect the intraday patterns of their demand deposit balances and the reserve balances of the clearing banks that senve them. When a m'epo investor' retur-ns the securities to the dealer-, then-c is an increase in the securities account of the dealer-at its clearing bank and an equal reduction in its demand deposit account. On the books of the Federal Reserve, there is an increase in the securities in the book-entry account of the clearing bank and a n'eduction in the r-eserve account of the cican-ing hank. The same transactions occur' when the dealer buys securities to hold in its inventory that day. The dealer builds its inventory of securities by oven-dr-awing its demand deposit account during the day. The dealers do not control the timing of these inflows of securities to their' accounts and the outflows from their demand deposit accounts, since the party that holds the securities initiates the transfer of securities and r-esen'ves through the F'edwir'e system. The process of overdrawing r'eserve and deposit accounts is reversed later' in the day as the dealer-s sell their inventor-ies of securities. The reserve accounts of the clearing banks rise as the bookentry securities are transferred to the accounts of other banks and reserve balances are simultaneously transferred to the accounts of the clearing banks. The timing of tr'ansactions in book-entry securities for the dealers causes the reserve accounts of the clearing banks to be overdrawn by billions of dollar-s during part of the day.
Implications for Risk-The clearing banks extend credit to government securities dealers during the day by allowing them to overdraw their demand deposit accounts. The banks limit their risk by obtaining a lien against the securities held for' the account of the dealers. Thus, a clearing bank could claim the securities credited to the account of a dealer' to cover any losses on its deposit overdraft
The Federal Reserve has considered various methods of establishing liens against the securities in the book-entry accounts of banks but has not initiated such collateral arrangements. Thus, the Fed is vulnerable to losses on the full amount of a bank's reserve oven-draft, whether the overdraft was generated through funds transfers or transactions in book-entry securities?
The risk implications of book'entry overdrafts can be illustrated by examining the balance sheet entries in table AZ. Bank A is a clearing bank for' a governments securities dealer. The dealer receives $25 in book-entry securities and has its demand deposit account debited by $25, leaving it overdrawn at that time. Suppose the dealer goes bankrupt after this transaction is completed. Bank A claims the $25 in securities that were credited to the securities account of the dealer to cover any possible losses on the deposit overdraft. The bank is spared any losses, and the Federal Reserve suffers no losses.
'Ibis hook-entry daylight oven-dr-aft, however, does leave the Federal Reserve vulnerable to a loss on the reserve overdraft. Suppose that after' the dealer' receives the $25 in book-entry securities, there is an announcement that implies a $15 loss in the value of the other assets of Bank A, as in the other illustrations. Under current an'angements, the Fed has no claim on the $25 in book-entry securities that had been transferred to Bank A, to offset its $5 loss. Thus, collateral agreements between clearing banks and the dealer's make Feder-al Reserve losses due to defaults by government securities dealer-s unlikely, but the daylight reserve mercial banks because of their effects on otherdepository institutions arid the financial markets in general. A lien on the book-entry securities of banks might make the supervisory authorities more reluctant to close a large hank that also serves as a clearing bank for' government securities dealers.
Issuing and Redeeming Commercial Paper
The timing of payments by banks involved in issuing and redeeming commercial paper-cn-eates reserve over-drafts. 4 Several banks act as agents for firms that issue commercial paper'. The agent banks collect funds from those purchasing the commercial paper-and transfer' them to the accounts of those firms issuing the paper. When the paper' matures, the agent banks collect fr'om the paper issuers and make payments to the holders of the paper.
When a firm issues commercial paper, the agent bank generally pays the firm before it receives payment from those buying the paper. During the period between the payment to the issuer and the receipts from the purchasers, the reserve account of the agent bank falls by the amount of the funds raised by issuing the commercial paper. The reserve balance of the agent bank also falls by the face amount of the issue when the paper matures; the agent bank generally makes payment to those holding the paper before receiving payment from the issuer'.
The effects of these transactions on the balance sheet of the agent bank are illustrated in table A3. A firm raises $25 by issuing commercial paper. Bank A is the agent bank, and both the issuer and purchaser' of the paper have their demand deposit accounts at Bank B. Early in the day on which the commer-cial paper is issued, Bank A transfer's $25
to Bank B, to be credited to the demand deposit account of the issuer. After-that transaction, the reserve account of Bank A is overdrawn by $15. In this example, the offsetting transaction is a $25 increase in an account called "reserves r'eceivable." Later that day, the purchaser of the paper arranges for Bank B to send $25 to Bank A over Fedwire, eliminating the reserve overdraft by the end of the day. As in the other balance sheets, the Federal Reserve is a general creditor of Bank A while its reserve account is overdrawn.
